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La Europa a distintas velocidades y la polarización política. El nuevo y 
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Europe à plusieurs vitesses et polarisation politique. Le nouveau et l’an-
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Abstract / Resumen / Résumé / Riassunto
This essay is not an attempt at a comprehensive or academic analysis of  
Joschka Fischer’s landmark speech of  2000. One could analyze whether 
he rightly predicted the pitfalls awaiting the EU with regard to regulating 
free movement of  workers in the enlarged Union or forging solidarity af-
ter the Eurozone crisis. Instead, this essay aims to reflect on two selected 
points that have changed significantly between 2000 and 2018. These two 
points are the conceptualization of  a differentiated integration within the 
EU and the role of  political ideology in the debate about EU’s goals. The 
question addressed when discussing these two issues is to what extent can 
the framework presented by Fischer in his speech be extended to include 
the newer developments, and to what extent do these newer developments 
put Fischer’s vision critically in question.
Este ensayo no es un intento de un análisis exhaustivo ni académico del 
discurso histórico de Joschka Fischer en el año 2000. Se podría analizar si 
predijo con razón los escollos que esperan a la UE con respecto a la regu-
lación de la libre circulación de trabajadores en la Unión ampliada o si se 
forja la solidaridad después de la crisis de la zona euro. En cambio, lo que 
pretende es reflexionar sobre dos puntos específicos que han cambiado 
significativamente entre 2000 y 2018. Estos dos puntos son la concep-
tualización de la integración diferenciada dentro de la UE y el papel de la 
ideología política en el debate sobre los objetivos de la UE. La pregunta 
que se aborda al analizar estos dos temas es hasta qué punto se puede 
extender el marco presentado por Fischer en su discurso para incluir los 
nuevos desarrollos y en qué medida estos nuevos desarrollos ponen la 
visión de Fischer críticamente en cuestión.
Cet essai ne constitue pas une tentative d’analyse exhaustive ou acadé-
mique du discours historique de Joschka Fischer en 2000. On pourrait 
déterminer s’il a prédit à juste titre les pièges qui attendent l’UE en ce qui 
concerne la réglementation de la libre circulation des travailleurs dans l’UE 
élargie ou si la solidarité est forgée après la crise dans la zone euro. Il vise 
plutôt à réfléchir sur deux points spécifiques qui ont considérablement 
changé entre 2000 et 2018. Ces deux points sont la conceptualisation de 
l’intégration différenciée au sein de l’UE et le rôle de l’idéologie politique 
dans le débat sur les objectifs de l’Union. La question qui est abordée lors 
de l’analyse de ces deux questions est de savoir dans quelle mesure le cadre 
présenté par Fischer peut être étendu dans son discours pour inclure de 
nouveaux développements et dans quelle mesure ces nouveaux dévelop-
pements mettent en cause de manière critique la vision de Fischer.
Questo saggio non è un tentativo di un’analisi esaustiva o accademica del 
discorso storico di Joschka Fischer nel 2000. Si potrebbe analizzare se ha 
predetto correttamente le insidie che attendono l’UE per quello che riguarda 
la regolamentazione della libera circolazione dei lavoratori nell’UE allargata 
o se è possibile forgiare la solidarietà dopo la crisi nella zona euro. Si riflette, 
invece, su due punti specifici che sono cambiati significativamente tra il 2000 
e il 2018. Questi due punti sono la concettualizzazione dell’integrazione dif-
ferenziata all’interno dell’UE e il ruolo dell’ideologia politica nel dibattito 
sugli obiettivi del UE. La domanda posta nell’analisi di queste due questioni 
è in che misura la situazione presentata da Fischer nel suo discorso può 
essere intesa per la inclusione di nuovi sviluppi, e in che misura questi nuovi 
sviluppi mettono in discussione in modo critico la visione di Fischer.
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In his speech given in 2000 at the Humboldt University 
in Berlin, Joschka Fischer focuses on three challenges 
- institutional overhaul of  European Union (EU) insti-
tutions, Eastern enlargement and differentiated integra-
tion.1 After 18 years, none of  the socio-political chal-
lenges that he identified seems to be outdated. At the 
moment when he gave his speech, the EU was facing 
these challenges with the debate about a constitutional 
treaty for Europe, negotiations with more than a dozen 
candidate countries in the final stages and new policy 
areas being added to the Treaties with several opt-outs.2 
In the meantime, these challenges have become burn-
ing wounds of  the EU. The Treaty Establishing the 
Constitution for Europe has been abandoned as a pro-
ject and instead the EU proceeded with a more tech-
nocratic Lisbon Treaty.3 11 countries of  Central and 
Eastern Europe have joined in 2004, 2007 and 2013 
without these institutional redesign in place and with 
several varied transitional measures. Finally, the extent 
of  géométrie variable has increased significantly, especially 
as policy areas such as Area Freedom Security and Jus-
tice (AFSJ) and Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) 
grew in importance.
The task of  this Special Issue is to look back at Fis-
cher’s speech from various angles.4 I propose to focus 
1  Joschka Fischer, “From Confederacy to Federation – Thought on 
the Finality of  European Integration”, 12.05.2000, available at: http://
ec.europa.eu/dorie/fileDownload.do?docId=192161&cardId=192161 
(14.10.2018)
2 The European Union is used to refer also the European Communities 
operating as its legal predecessors
3  See i.a. Juliane Kokott and Alexandra Rüth, The European Convention 
and Its Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe: Appropria-
te Answers to the Laeken Questions, 40 Common Market L. Rev. 1315 
(2003); Armin von Bogdandy, The European Constitution and European 
Identity: Text and Subtext of  the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for 
Europe, 3 Int’l J. Const. L. 295 (2005) and for the bigger debate: Erik 
Oddvar Eriksen, John Erik Fossum, Agustín Menéndez, Developing a 
Constitution for Europe, Routledge, 2004
4  This has also been done immediately after the speech, see Christian Joer-
ges, Yves Meny, Joseph H.H. Weiler (eds.),What Kind of  Constitution for 
What Kind of  Polity? Responses to Joschka Fischer, EUI 2000, available 
on the relevance of  Fischer’s vision presented in 2000 
to the current challenges of  the EU. This short per-
sonal essay is not an attempt at a comprehensive nor 
academic analysis of  Fischer’s landmark speech. One 
could analyze to whether he rightly predicted the pit-
falls awaiting the EU with regard to regulating free 
movement of  workers in the enlarged Union or forging 
solidarity after the Eurozone crisis. Those ships have 
sailed. Instead, this essay aims to reflect on two select-
ed points that have changed significantly between 2000 
and 2018. These two points are the conceptualization 
of  differentiated integration within the EU and the role 
of  political ideology in the debate about EU’s finality. 
The question addressed when discussing these two is-
sues is to what extent can the framework presented by 
Fischer in his speech be extended to include the newer 
developments and to what extent do these newer devel-
opments put Fischer’s vision critically in question. 
Differentiated integration
First point is the differentiated integration that Joschka 
Fischer discusses as a challenge but which has large-
ly become the reality of  the EU’s functioning in the 
meantime. Fischer identifies the deep roots of  that 
practice in the founding visions of  European integra-
tion. Smaller groups of  countries were expected to 
take the lead with deeper integration (p.12). They are 
expected to keep the membership in their group open 
to others who will join later – either because they are 
convinced or because they have no other alternative. 
Such enhanced cooperation has been constitutionalized 
in the EU Treaties. The main risk that Fischer perceives 
In this context is the threat to his unitary vision of  the 
EU. He accepts the idea of  “center of  gravity” or an 
“avant-garde” of  European integration (.p.14). Further, 
he seems to equal this center with the leading duo of  
Germany and France (p.4) or at least the founding six 
at http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/17255/ResponsesToJ.
FISCHER_2000.pdf?sequence=1 (14.10.2018) 
























Member States (p.13). This unitary vision of  a “Euro-
pean ideal” (p.13) leaves little space for the EU and the 
EU institutions to become a structure for deliberation 
about competing European ideals. 
With 18 more years of  practice of  differentiated 
integration, we can clearly see that the increased com-
plexity of  decision making was not the crucial prob-
lem. The crucial problem was rather guaranteeing the 
equality before the law in light of  a web of  bilateral 
and multilateral legal agreements. Length of  the meet-
ings (p.19) was not the real stumbling stone even for a 
Commission of  28 members, which could have proba-
bly been Fischer’s nightmare at the time. The problem 
is also not the confusion as to what is the EU acquis 
in an Union of  28 members. Instead, the current chal-
lenge is the enforcement of  equal standards and equal 
treatment by the EU institutions of  individual Member 
States. We can see this with countries such as Denmark 
that has a general AFSJ opt-out while participating on 
a bilateral basis in the Schengen Area.5 Also non-EU 
countries participating in certain EU legal instruments, 
such as Switzerland or Norway, are subject to less strin-
gent enforcement rules. Finally, EU Member States 
have also used this flexibility to make arrangements 
outside of  the EU legal framework, such as with the 
European Stability Mechanism, which was established 
as a separate international organization first.6 The redis-
tribution of  votes according to financial contributions 
in such parallel structures poses serious challenges for 
the constitutional nature of  the Treaties.7 It has been 
also raised that the structure of  EU law might put the 
countries of  Central and Eastern Europe at a disadvan-
tage when trying to argue similar exceptions.8
5  Ester Herlin-Karnell, Denmark and the European Area of  Freedom, Se-
curity and Justice: A Scandinavian Arrangement, Amsterdam Law Forum 
(2013) issue 1, 2015, page 95.
6 Pola Cebulak, Constitutional and administrative paradigms in judicial 
control over EU high and low politics’, Perspectives of  Federalism (PoF), 
2/2017, page 249.
7 See Deirdre Curtin, Challenging Executive Dominance in European De-
mocracy, Modern Law Review 77(1), 2014, pages 1-32.
8 Damjan Kukovec, Economic Law, Inequality and Hidden Hierarchies on 
the EU Internal Market, Michigan Journal of  International Law, Vol. 38, 
nº 1, 2016.
While dealing with differentiated integration in 2018 
is still a challenge, the main threat that a realization of  
multi-speed Europe is posing is not that it might open 
a Pandora box of  visions of  Europe but rather that it 
might enhance the inequalities within the EU.
Political Polarization
Second point that has transformed into a completely 
new challenge is the positioning of  political ideology 
in the debate about Europe and the EU. In 2018, in 
her Humboldt speech, Susanne Baer, a judge at the 
German Federal Constitutional Court, talked explicitly 
about “the right attacking rights”.9 In 2000, Fischer was 
not that explicit about the correlations between polit-
ical ideology and the competing visions of  Europe’s 
finality. However, it appears impossible to understand 
why he refrains from questioning certain basic prem-
ises without positioning him in the mainstream polit-
ical ideology of  his times. Joschka Fischer served as a 
vice-chancellor and Minister of  Foreign Affairs in the 
cabinet of  Gerhard Schröder between 1998 and 2005. 
Together with Tony Blair and other politicians in the 
Western hemisphere, he was part of  the “Third Way” 
of  social democracy. Third Way was presented as an 
alternative to the “old left” and the “new right”.10 This 
renewal of  social-democratic agenda around the turn 
of  the millennium involved a modernized attempt of  
squaring welfare with market economy.11 It allowed the 
social democratic parties, inter alia in UK, US and Ger-
many to enlarge their support by occupying the politi-
9  In resonance to Fischer’s speech, the Walter Hallstein-Institute for Eu-
ropean Constitutional Law at the Humboldt University started a series of  
talks by public intellectuals, politicians and academics called “Humboldt 
Reden zu Europa”. For the one referred to see Susanne Baer, Humboldt-
Rede zu Europa: “Rights under Pressure in Europe”- Dr. Susanne Baer, 
25.01.2018, available at https://youtu.be/GZenLGZtfsQ (14.10.2018).
10  Martin Powell, New Labour and the third way in the British welfare 
state: a new and distinctive approach?, Critical Social Policy, Vol. 20, Issue 
1, 2000, pages 39-60. 
11  Anthony Giddens, The Third Way: The Renewal of  Social Democracy, 
John Wiley & Sons, 2013.
























cal center. Schröder’s government has been advocating 
such Third-Way policies in Germany.
Viewed from the perspective of  nearly two dec-
ades, Third Way politics have been subject to substan-
tial criticism. They have been criticized for prioritizing 
pragmatism over ideology.12 Moreover, they have been 
masking liberal ideology and the importance of  power 
relations by downplaying the left-right divide.13 Similar-
ly, translated to the European debates, the emergence 
of  Third Way might have silenced certain debates at 
European level. The Third-Way left-wing parties have 
refrained from challenging the insulation of  the mar-
kets from political interference at European level.14 The 
lack of  explicit debate in terms of  left and right politics 
in Fischer’s speech seems to resonate with these obser-
vations. Finally, Jan Zielonka drawing on the consen-
sus between liberal parties, assigns them the blame for 
the current rise of  populism.15 His broad definition of  
“liberals” includes the Third Way as well as the author 
himself. The scope of  their failures is also broad – from 
growing technocracy to exploding inequalities.16 In par-
ticular at EU level, the liberal consensus has prevented 
the voicing of  alternatives to the co-existence of  ne-
oliberal economics and technocratic politics. Fischer’s 
speech operates within the limits of  this liberal consen-
sus and reflects the Third-Way agenda. He focuses on 
the reforms to improve institutional functioning of  the 
EU and conceptualization of  an European federation, 
without questioning the desirability of  further econom-
ic integration as a finality of  the EU. 
12  Michael Temple, New Labour’s Third Way: Pragmatism and Gover-
nance, The British Journal of  Politics and International Relations , Vol 2, 
Issue 3, 2000, pages 302-325.
13  Chantal Mouffe, “The radical centre.” Soundings 9.Summer (1998): 11-23, 13.
14 Mark A. Pollack, “Blairism in Brussels: the third way in Europe since 
Amsterdam.” The state of  the European Union: Risks, reform, resistance, 
and revival (2000): 266-291, 267.
15  Jan Zielonka, Counter-Revolution: Liberal Europe in Retreat, Oxford 
University Press, 2018.
16  Ibid.
The speech draws a tension between two reactions 
to change - the popular backlash resulting from anxiety 
and embracing a historic opportunity.17 Unfortunately, 
he might have underestimated the extent of  this back-
lash. Large part of  Fischer’s vision of  institutional re-
form towards a symbolic constitutional materialized in 
the project of  the Treaty Establishing the Constitution-
al for Europe, which was abandoned after negative re-
sults of  popular votes in France and the Netherlands.18
Conclusions
In conclusion, if  we were to reproduce the popular 
“Look Who’s Back” narrative and ask how would Jo-
schka Fischer feel coming back from his consultancy 
perspective today into a public position of  thinking 
about the finality of  European integration, he would 
probably have little trouble adapting.19 Many key chal-
lenges, in particular the lack of  consensus about the fi-
nality of  the EU project, remain of  relevance. However, 
this short essay has focused on some crucial elements 
that have changed in the last 18 years.
While framing a vision for differentiated integration 
and left-right politics remain a challenges for European 
elites, they have become completely different challeng-
es, rooted in completely new reasons. Differentiated 
integration is not about spill-overs and coherence, but 
rather about systemic inequalities and legitimacy in en-
forcement. When it comes to political ideology, the lib-
eral consensus has been challenged and the political de-
bate is characterized by increased polarization.Fischer’s 
vision lacks responses for these transformed challenges.
17  Joschka Fischer, “From Confederacy to Federation – Thought on the 
Finality of  European Integration”, page 7.
18  See footnote n.4
19 Reference to the book Timur Vermes, Look Who’s Back, Eichborn VEr-
lag, 2012; for more information on Joschka Fischer’s career development 
see Loren Balhorn, Joschka Fischer’s Long March, Jacobin, 23.05.2018, 
available at https://jacobinmag.com/2018/05/joschka-fischers-long-
march/ (14.10.2018)
